Is Perceived Weakness Provocative?

The NATO Bucharest Summit of 2008 and West-Russia Relations 

 Introduction 

There is a widespread view among policymakers, including among academics, that NATO enlargement in what the Kremlin considers to be its “privileged sphere of interests” will provoke Russia and cause instability in the region. The 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit serves as a good illustration of this view, when European countries led by France and Germany, despite opposition from the US, refused to grant Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine. Their reasoning was clear: antagonizing relations with an increasingly assertive Russia would endanger the stability of the region and jeopardize their relationship with Moscow. A compromise was reached at the Bucharest Summit, NATO declaring that Georgia and Ukraine will become NATO members, without specifying when and how this would happen. In August 2008, the Georgia-Russia war erupted. 

Whilst there are various schools of thoughts that argue against NATO enlargement, the paper will focus on realism and counter-argue the view of prominent realist thinkers. In their view, enlarging into a great power’s sphere of influence (i.e., Russia’s) will ultimately provoke aggression and cause instability, citing the Georgia-Russia War and the Ukraine crisis as examples (Mearsheimer, 2018) (Walt, 2014). My goal is to examine why and how this view might be inaccurate, by answering the following research question – why did NATO disunity and lack of clear policy in 2008 provoke Russia and cause instability in the region despite expectations that respect for ‘spheres of influence’ and non-expansion would appease Russia and maintain stability? In the context of Georgia-Russia war that erupted a few months after the NATO Summit, the paper will analyse whether the lack of clarity and unity within the West and its decision not to grant MAP to Georgia by fear of not angering Russia, was perceived as weakness by the Kremlin and undermined Georgia’s security but also European stability; whether the policy of compromise adopted by France and Germany emboldened Russian bellicosity towards its neighbours by failing to deter Moscow. Whilst many policymakers and commentators have written or discussed the implications of Bucharest Summit of 2008 and NATO enlargement as a deterrent measure, there is an existing gap in academic literature specifically addressing this issue in the context of Georgia-Russia relations. This paper is an attempt to bring these vital insights together and ground them in IR theory. 

Outline 

First, I will set out my theoretical framework by bringing together insights from the realist school of thought and deterrence theory to see what kind of policy deters aggression. Whilst I believe that other schools of thought such as liberalism, international society as well as constructivism contribute and enrich academic discussions, in order to counter-argue the position of realist thinkers, using the same basic realist foundations provides a more convincing argument. Therefore, I leave aside topics such as international law, democracy, and the right to self-determination to focus purely on power politics and deterrence. The analysis section will present the existing realist view and address Russia’s growing assertiveness and its rejections of the post-Cold war security order, including Moscow’s hostile attitude towards its ‘near abroad’. After examining Georgia’s motivations regarding Euro-Atlantic integration, its conflicting national interests with Russia and Western interests in Georgia, I intend to use the theoretical framework on deterrence to see whether contrary to the prevailing realist view that enlargement i.e., a strong policy provokes Russia, on the contrary, it deters Russia and maintains stability. By using realism’s foundational assumptions and by linking the Bucharest Summit and the 2008 war, the paper will investigate whether Western disunity, inconsistency, absence of political will and a policy of compromise weakened its power to deter Russian aggression and ultimately, endangered European stability. 

Theoretical Framework 

I. Core Assumptions of Realism 

As Morgenthau argued “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (Morgenthau, 1948:13). Realists believe that states are the main actors in international politics, seeking survival in anarchy, anarchy in this case, being the absence of central authority. Realists focus on great powers, since they have the most impact on world politics (Mearsheimer, 2018). States are rational, unitary actors that are functionally alike and act according to their self-interest, i.e., states make cost-benefit calculations to ensure their survival. Neorealists, treating the state as a black box and disregarding the importance of norms and ideas or domestic variables, believe that the international structure i.e., the distribution of capabilities (material power) in the international system (polarity) pushes and pulls states towards certain types of behaviour “international structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them towards others” (Waltz, 2000: 74). Thus, international structure determines the behaviour states. All states seek to maximize power either internally through a military build-up or economic growth (internal balancing) or through alliances to compensate for their weakness (external balancing) such as NATO (Waltz, 1979). Neorealism thus, underlines that international politics is a perpetual struggle between great powers trapped in a security dilemma, whereby states constantly compete for influence and power. For realists, relative gains are more important than absolute gains therefore a state’s primary goal is to ensure that no one is more powerful – one’s gain is the other’s loss. 

Within neorealism, there are variations. Whilst Waltz is a defensive realist, Mearsheimer represents offensive realists who believe that states are always uncertain about each other’s intentions, therefore, “states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system” (Mearsheimer, 2001:33). In this view, states are offensive, power maximisers that seek hegemony and expansion. Realism argues that in anarchy, where survival is the main goal, great powers create buffer zones i.e., spheres of influence to defend from potential enemies i.e., other great powers and/or project power (Jackson, 2019). Whilst through the balance of power theory structural realism can predict international behaviour and outcomes such as balancing, buck-passing, bandwagoning, it fails to address the processes inside the state and thus, cannot explain the specific foreign policy of states. 

Neoclassical realism, which combines system-level variables (independent variable) with state-level variables (dependent variables) explains how systemic pressures from the international structure are filtered through state-level variables that act as a transmission belt; these variables can be leader’s perceptions about power distribution (Zakaria, 1999), motivations, state structure, elite ideology etc. (Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, 2009), therefore it is better suited to explain specific foreign policy outcomes. Whilst keeping the primacy of the international structure, neoclassical realists are able to explain for instance how an increase in material power, combined with greater extraction capacity and strong state structure can result in expansionist foreign policy. 

II. Rational Deterrence 

Defining Deterrence 

Realism argues that states are rational actors, who make decisions based on cost-benefit analysis. Classical deterrence theory builds on rational theory and argues that a “state can guarantee its security by persuading its adversaries that an attack would lead to severe repercussions at a cost that would clearly offset any potential gains (Morin and Paquin, 2018: 8). Deterrence is defined as the action of “causing someone not to do something because they expect or fear that they will be worse off if they do it than if they do not” (Mueller,2018: 78), or as a “threat [that] serves as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the intended action because of the costs and losses the target would incur” (Huth, 1999:26). The literature of deterrence distinguishes between two strategies of deterrence – deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. Whilst the former strategy is designed to “deter an action by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives” (Mazarr, 2020:15), deterrence by punishment involves “severe penalties, such as nuclear escalation or severe economic sanctions, if an attack occurs” (Mazarr, 2020:15). Furthermore, deterrence can be general i.e., ongoing for long periods  of time or immediate, short-term crises that require urgent response. There are also significant differences between direct deterrence i.e., preventing an attack on one’s own state and territory and extended deterrence which “consists of discouraging attacks on third parties, such as allies or partners” (Mazarr, 2020:16) i.e., discouraging an attack on a NATO country for example. Deterrence, whilst mostly treated as military threats in academic literature, can in fact encompass other types of threats such as that of economic sanctions. Whilst these are focused on affecting the cost-benefit analysis of the attacker, other types of measures include “offering reassurances and benefits that make a world without aggression more attractive” (Mazarr, 2020:19). Thus, scholars differentiate between four types of deterrence: direct-immediate deterrence; direct-general deterrence; extended-immediate deterrence; extended-general deterrence (Morgan,1977). 

The goal of deterrence is not only the prevention of specific wars but also, resistance to the political and military demands of a challenger “if armed conflict is avoided at the price of diplomatic concessions to the maximum demands of the potential attacker under the threat of war, then we cannot claim that deterrence has succeeded” (Huth, 1999:28.). For instance, giving Russia a veto right on NATO membership by fear of conflict, clearly represents an act of failed deterrence, whereby NATO makes far-reaching concessions. Historically, the Munich analogy and British and French appeasement of Hitler are used as examples of failed deterrence. 

Successful Deterrence 

For the failure or the success of deterrence, capabilities and perceptions of the challenger are key (Jervis, 1983). First, the defender should have the military capability to deter but this is not enough; the challenger should believe that the deterrent state has the military capabilities and the political will to carry out the threat “the important thing is not merely having a capability—it is projecting the willingness to use it” (Schelling, 1980:11). Second, the key to successful deterrence is the ability to clearly communicate credible intentions and threats. Thus, extended deterrence is far more challenging, not only because it is more difficult to project military power in distant areas but also for reasons of credibility. Whilst it is easy to predict that an attack on the US homeland will result in a US counterattack, it is harder for challengers to understand whether the West will come to defend its geographically distant partner countries such as the Baltics states in case of a Russian attack. Rhetoric as Schelling argued, is never enough “saying so, does not make it true; and if it is true, saying so does not always make it believed. We evidently do not want war and would only fight if we had to. The problem is to demonstrate that we would have to” (1966:35). Indeed, “to fight abroad is a military act, but to persuade enemies or allies that one would fight abroad, under circumstances of great cost and risk, requires more than a military capability. It requires projecting intentions” (Schelling, 1966:36). According to this logic, acquiring these intentions and persuading enemies that one will act on them is crucial. Therefore, power is not only military capability but as Krauthammer once argued „influence and power are not always reflected in objective numbers. The power of a country equals real power, multiplied by its desire and willingness to use it. Russia is ready to use force to strengthen its influence […] if America is not ready to use its power, it means it is powerless. It is a matter of political will “(2013), thus political will becomes key. “This axiom highlights two distinct factors—capability and will. Perceived weakness in either can undermine deterrence” (Mazarr, 2020:25). NATO’s Article 5 on collective defence of the Washington treaty illustrates this logic – the defender will have no choice but to respond to an attack on its allies. In the Cold War period, NATO was successful in deterring the USSR as Snyder argued because of the presence of the US in Europe which „strengthens the probable or evident willingness of the West to activate the strategic airpower deterrent “(Snyder, 1959:9) by putting US prestige, credibility as well as military personnel and infrastructure on the line. 

The Role of Reputation and the Interdependence of Commitments 

Schelling (1966) argued that commitments are interdependent across countries and issue areas, claiming that failure to respond to USSR’s aggressive actions in one place such (e.g., Asia), would translate into more aggressive actions somewhere else (Western Europe). He argued that if a country follows its obligations and carries out its threats, its commitments will remain credible, whilst if a country backs down and does not carry out its threats, it will appear weak, irresolute and the subsequent deterrent threats will not be taken seriously “expecting that future behaviour will mimic past behaviour, observers are more prone to challenge such a country, expecting their opponent to back down when challenged […] a state’s behaviour in interactions with country A in a dispute over territory in Asia will influence country B’s behaviour in a potential regime dispute with that state in Europe.” (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015:476). Thus, reputation for resolve refers to others’ perception of the deterrent state’s willingness to respond. 

Some academics Fearon (1994), Hopf (1994), Mercer (1996) cast doubt on the importance of reputation, instead emphasizing the role of power and interests and the specificity of crisis yet recent studies show how reputation for resolve becomes crucial for the success of deterrence especially in case of repeated interactions, many such as Grieco (2001), Clare and Dilanovic (2010) arguing that past actions matter more especially among enduring rivals or specific opponents, claiming that countries that backed down are more likely to be challenged by the same opponent. Reputation allows for the possibility of learning “by incorporating private information about one side’s willingness to suffer costs to achieve a desirable political end” (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015:480), therefore during cost-benefit analysis, information about the state’s past behaviour becomes an important element. The implications for deterrence is that “bad reputation leads observers to believe that they can convince the country in question to make more significant political concessions than they otherwise would have been willing to make […] countries that would have initiated a crisis anyway now ask for more […], countries that would not have initiated a dispute now believe that it is worthwhile to do so.”(Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015:481). 

Theoretical framework derived from the literature on deterrence allows me to investigate whether deterrence failed at the Bucharest Summit, specifically testing these hypotheses: 

1. The NATO Bucharest Summit’s statement exemplified an unclear and inconsistent policy of the West regarding Georgia.  

2. The lack of unity and over granting MAP to Georgia questioned the credibility of NATO to defend its partner country, this, combined with the absence of political will, was perceived as Western weakness by Russia who used this opportunity to achieve its geopolitical goals. 

3. The response to the Georgia-Russia war undermined the West’s reputation for resolve and further emboldened Russia, resulting in revisionist policies. 

Going back to my research question, I intend to see whether contrary to the prevailing view that enlargement causes bellicosity and instability, instead enlargement, consistency and resolve deters Russia and guarantees stability. 

Methodology 

In terms of methodology, I will use qualitative methods such as official documents, academic literature as well conducted interviews. I will use academic sources but also insights gathered from the semi-structured online interviews I conducted with policymakers and academics in July 2021. Due to a lack of academic literature specifically addressing the Bucharest Summit and Western disunity, interviews provided vital understandings. As part of my research, I interviewed US experts: Daniel Fried, former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs (2005-2009), presently a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, Ben Hodges who served as commanding general of United States Army Europe and now is the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis and Luke Coffey, Director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. From Georgia, I interviewed former MP Helen Khoshtaria, as well as the former Minister of Euro-Atlantic Integration of Georgia who is now a professor at Sciences Po Paris, Thornike Gordadze. From the Baltics region, I interviewed Žygimantas Pavilionis, a Lithuanian politician and member of the Seimas, who was a leading actor in Lithuania’s path to Euro-Atlantic integration. Unfortunately, I was unable to interview those who argue against enlargement, instead focusing on their published work. All respondents have provided written consent to be named. 

Analysis 

Chapter 1: NATO Enlargement and Russia’s Assertiveness 

1.1 Brief Overview of NATO Goals 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was created in 1949 during the Cold War, to deter the Soviets in Europe “to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down” as its first secretary general, Lord Lionel Hastings Ismay said (Schorr, 2009). The policy of containment authored by Kennan, envisaged a US military presence in Europe to protect European nations from totalitarian threat (Gaddis, 2005). NATO’s Article 5, collective defence guaranteed that an attack on one, is an attack on all (NATO, 2021) involving the US in case of conflict. Following the collapse of the USSR, despite external opposition from Russia as well as internal opposition, NATO enlarged and invited members of the former Warsaw Pact first in 1999, and then in 2004, incorporating the Baltic States as well as other Central European countries (Asmus, 2010). Simultaneously it reached out to Russia as well, first in 1994 with the Partnership for Peace, then in 1997 with the NATO-Russia Founding act and finally in 2002, with the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NATO, 2019). In the US view, NATO guaranteed peace and stability in Europe which historically was prone to conflict and war. Furthermore, the Clinton Administration’s desire to expand NATO was due to “its risk-aversion to even the smallest prospect of Russia emerging as a threat” (Wallander, 2000:723). Historically, NATO has been the most successful military alliance, with US presence, NATO members are protected internally and externally (Mearsheimer, 2010:389). 

1.2 Realist Views on NATO enlargement 

Realists believe that enlarging NATO will provoke Russia and cause conflict, therefore, they strongly believe that the West should not meddle in what Russia considers to be its “zone of privileged interests”. When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Mearsheimer argued that the “US and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West ” (2014). Mearsheimer (2014), Walt (2014), Waltz (2000), Kennan (1998), Sakwa (2016) among others, argue that Russian hostility is the result of insecurity that has been fuelled by NATO enlargement. These scholars condemn the West for attempting to integrate post-Soviet Republics in Euro-Atlantic structures. Mearsheimer contends that NATO enlargement, EU enlargement and democracy promotion are perceived by Russians as threats, underlining that “great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory” (Mearsheimer, 2014). He further argues that “Putin and his compatriots have been thinking and acting like realists, while Western leaders have adhered to textbook liberal ideas about international politics. The result is that the United States and its allies unwittingly provoked a major crisis” (Mearsheimer, 2018:184) In this view, Russia is only defending what is considered to be its ‘sphere of influence’ i.e., vital interests from Western interference. Mearsheimer argues that the solution would be for Ukraine and Georgia to become a neutral buffer zone. Carpenter (2014) has also argued that to avoid an unnecessary conflict, the US should be “willing to respect a Russian sphere of influence” in Eastern Europe. Allison (2020) recently also stated that now that the unipolar moment is gone, the US should accept Russia’s sphere of influence to prevent conflict and instability. In his view, letting Russia dominate its ‘near abroad’ will ultimately lead to peace and stability in an era of mounting tensions. Brands summarizes Allison’s underlying logic “first, to create a cleaner separation between contending parties by clearly marking where one’s influence ends and the other’s begins; and second, to reduce the chances of conflict by giving rising or resurgent powers a safe zone along their border” (Brands, 2020). Going back to the 1990s, Kennan called NATO enlargement in the 1990s “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era” (Congressional record, 1998), arguing that NATO expansion would represent a huge blow to Russian prestige and security interests that would have detrimental effects on Russian democracy and inflame nationalistic and militaristic sentiments. 

1.3 Russia’s Renewed Assertiveness 

The fall of the Soviet Union resulted in Russia’s decline, which greatly damaged its status and prestige in the international system. Russians blamed the West for its humiliation during the 1990s (Wilson, 2010), Putin stating that the collapse of the USSR was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” (Osborn 2011). Yet by the 2000s, as predicted by realist theory, having consolidated economic power through oil revenues and state power by eroding the little democracy that existed during Yeltsin time, Putin since 2007 has become more repressive at home and more bellicose abroad (Conradi, 2017) (Maitra, 2014), many arguing that Russia is behaving like a ‘rising power, attempting to become a regional or global superpower’ (Feinstein and Pirro, 2021:1). 

Indeed, the Russian regime has gradually become more repressive, centralizing, and personalizing decision-making, suppressing political opposition, closing NGOs, and limiting free media, thus increasing its mobilization capacity. The reinforcement of the power vertical and the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ introduced by Surkov in 2006 show how the Russian regime has consolidated wealth and power that directly translates into state power (Lyne, 2015). Gordadze also underlined that Russia’ approach to world politics is characterised by “a binary and Manichaean vision – those who are not with us, are against us” (Gordadze, 2021), arguing that Russia is a textbook example of offensive realism, strategically using international law and organizations to promote state interests, rather than cooperation (Allison 2009). Khoshtaria also discussed Moscow’s offensive realist stance arguing that it views the world through the prism of realism “It wants to achieve a great power status and challenge the post-Cold War order, of which NATO enlargement in what Russia considers to be its zone of influence is a significant barrier” This is what Moscow openly states and does since gaining power” (Khoshtaria, 2021). This assertiveness was illustrated by Putin’s Munich Speech in 2007, which marked a clear departure from ‘strategic partnership’ to great power competition (Conradi, 2017), which led many to argue that Russia has become a „model of independent GP resuming its position on its own terms” (Lyne, 2015:6) rejecting the existing status-quo. Indeed, the Kremlin does not hide his desire to create a multipolar order and challenge US hegemony (Chebankova, 2017) of which the Munich Speech serves as a good illustration – Putin embraced Moscow’s great power ambitions and voiced his rejection of the post-Cold War security architecture. 

The Munich speech exemplified the Kremlin’s consistent national interests as written in the various Foreign Policy Concepts which include “provision of security and autonomy, maximization of material utilities, but also maximization of status/prestige” (Kropatcheva, 2012:38). First, Russia aspires to restore its great power status and embraces the idea of a multipolar world, rejecting US hegemony and the foundations of the current international order. Second, the Kremlin argues that it aims to create a buffer zone to guarantee its security in the international system. Moscow opposes NATO enlargement on the grounds that being surrounded by NATO members ultimately threatens Russia “the Russian Federation maintains its negative perspective towards NATO’s expansion, the Alliance’s military infrastructure approaching Russian borders, and its growing military activity in regions neighbouring Russia” (Russian Foreign Policy Concept, 2016). 

In this context, Russia has been increasingly hostile towards its immediate neighbours that have become democracies aspiring to join Euro-Atlantic structures, thereby increasing Western influence in the region (Greene, 2012). The Colour Revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, which saw the rise of Western liberal elite in power (Asmus, 2010) (Kagan, 2008) ultimately represent a significant challenge to Putin’s plan to reverse the post-Cold War security architecture as pointed out by Gordadze and Khoshtaria (2021). Therefore, the Kremlin uses its foreign policy to ensure that none of the countries that it considers part of its ‘privileged zone of interest’ become a successful democracy. In this context, whilst the West embraces the Charter of Paris adopted and signed in 1990, including by Russia, which sets out the foundations of the international order by emphasizing the sovereignty and the principle of self-determination thereby renouncing the notions of ‘spheres of influence’ and great power politics, Moscow argues it should have a say in the internal and external affairs of post-Soviet countries, especially regarding their foreign policy orientation (Lyne, 2015) (Asmus, 2010). Lo (2015) also underlines that whilst Russia is not interested in rebuilding the USSR as it does not seek direct integration of post-Soviet republics, Russia has a sense of entitlement derived from its belief in shared history and culture; it demands from external actors such as the West and from the former-Soviet states themselves to “factor Russian interests into their decision-making” (Lo, 2015:102). To this end, the Kremlin has been creating various organizations to formalize its sphere of influence – the CSTO, Eurasian Economic Union and so on. Informally, Russia has been launching a hybrid warfare against frontline states, using economic, geopolitical, cultural, cyber as well as energy tools to keep countries under its control (Lucas and Pomeratsev, 2016). In line with realism, the Kremlin’s perceptions of increasing material power as well as state centralization and consolidation, resulted in attempts to become a regional hegemon and reverse the US-led order. 

The Kremlin, acting according to realist dictates, makes decisions based on cost-benefit calculations and uses every opportunity to expand, being very opportunistic as underlined by Coffey (2021). The recent research conducted by Feinstein and Pirro (2021) captures well Russia’s realist behaviour combined with strategic information gathering. They argue that “in a realist world, tests are essential to a revisionist state’s security. State expansion […] necessitates information gathering” (Feinstein and Pirro, 2021:5). Challenging the notion that states have perfect information, they argue that in an anarchic world full of uncertainty, Russia is gathering information through strategic testing to learn what they can get away with, what is their place in the system and how others react to their aggressive policies For instance, NATO’s Article 5 envisages collective defence in case of an attack, but what constitutes an attack remains less certain, “to clear up the uncertainty, a revisionist state may decide to test the alliance” (Feinstein and Pirro,2021:5). In this view, Russia is testing and acting strategically in its near abroad, towards NATO members and in areas where the US has strategic interests as in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. In the case of Georgia and Ukraine “Russia has tested the international community’s foundational respect for sovereignty in Eastern Europe. The United States and Europe […] have done little or nothing to roll back Russia. This response illustrates that in the emerging international order, traditional expansionism and violations of sovereignty are possible, but not necessarily desirable” (Feinstein and Pirro,2021:9). In conclusion, in line with realism, Russia’s newly found assertiveness because of increasing material power in the 2000s, allows it to expand when it sees the opportunity to do so. 

Chapter 2: Overview of Georgia-NATO Relations 

2.1 Antagonisms between Georgia and Russia 

Many argue that Russia is acting defensively (Mearsheimer, 2018) and reacting to NATO enlargement, yet Georgia and its northern neighbour have a long history of antagonisms, dating back to a time when NATO did not exist. In 1801 after the Russian Empire annexed Georgia, the latter became a governorate of the Russian Empire. When in 1918, Georgia declared independence, Soviet troops invaded the country in 1921. After 70 years of occupation, Georgia gained its independence in 1991, but the 1990s proved to be an especially turbulent period for Georgia. With great support from the Kremlin (Siroky, 2016), separatist groups in Abkhazia and Samachablo regions demanded independence, leading to a civil war in which “Russian conservatives and nationalists sought actively to undermine Georgia’s drive for independence in the early 1990s by, among other things, assisting separatist movements” (Asmus, 2010:56). Whilst the UN and OSCE negotiated a ceasefire agreement between the two parties, ultimately, due to their unwillingness to station significant numbers of peacekeeping forces, Russia stationed its own peacekeeping missions, thereby increasing its power, influence and hold over Abkhazia and Samachablo. This mistake, as Asmus argued “would come back to haunt the West in summer of 2008” (Asmus, 2010:65) who supported Russia’s role as a mediator. 

The antagonisms between the two states have been especially pronounced after the Rose Revolution in 2003, when Georgia’s former-President Shevardnadze was forced to resign. Whilst some argue that the root of the conflict was former-President’s Saakashvili’s erratic personality, every head of government since the 1990s, including Saakashvili has tried to normalize relations with Russia and all such attempts have failed.

Shevardnadze tried to do so by joining the CIS as well as encouraging cooperation over the break-away regions, but his attempts resulted in significant disputes, especially during the Chechen wars (Khoshtaria, 2021). Thus, Shevardnadze was forced to turn to the West, through the establishment of GUAM, the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in 1999 as well as greater military cooperation with the United States. In 2002, Shevardnadze formally declared Georgia’s desire to join NATO due to Russia’s attempts to destabilize the country (NATO, 2002). His successor, Saakashvili also tried to normalize relations with Russia by holding his first presidential visit with Putin. Yet as Georgia advanced on its path to modernization and democratization, relations with Russia deteriorated further. Tensions increased subsequently after the terrorist attack on the police building of the Gori, Georgian city which killed three people and wounded thirty. The Georgian Intelligence Service found Russian involvement in the attack. The Georgian government arrested Russian spies and as a response, Russia started the forceful deportation of Georgian citizens residing in Russia, “2,380 Georgians were expelled in the next two months, while some 2,200 others left by their own means after receiving deportation orders” (Lucas 2009:142). Subsequent imposition of economic sanctions – banning the import of Georgian wine, water, agricultural products as well as a full-scale economic and transport embargo, increasing the gas price from 64$ to 235$ between 2005-2007 all lead to further escalation of the conflict (Lebanidze, 2016). As argued by Khoshtaria (2021), conflict from Russia does not stem from personality traits of leaders but from conflicting national interests “objective realities of Georgia’s external security environment explain why Shevardnadze and Saakashvili, despite tangible differences between the two administrations, both tried to balance the Russian threat by relying on cooperation with Western states and institutions” (Gvalia, Lebanidze and Siroky, 2019:23). 

2.2 Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic Aspirations 

Georgia is often described as “the most fervent pursuer of membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization among remaining candidates” (Welt, 2008:1). For Georgia, membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations, including membership of NATO is driven primarily by security imperatives and as a reaction to Russia’s offensive actions, perceived by Georgia as security threats. From a realist perspective, membership to NATO guarantees security i.e., survival, from an ideational perspective, it captures the idea of “‘return to Europe’ (German, 2015). Thus, conflict with Russia stems from conflicting national interests, but also from conflicting identities and ideology. Neoclassical realism provides a solid framework for analysis. 

“The major influence on Georgia’s security environment, and thus of its foreign policy priorities, since regaining independence, is the presence and threat of Russian power” (Gvalia, Lebanidze and Siroky, 2019:23), therefore, the foreign policy of each government has been formulated in response to Russia’s hostile actions. Realism dictates that small states will either balance against the powerful state in the region or bandwagon; more precisely, using Walt’s (1987) theory, states tend to balance against threats, not necessarily against all powerful states. Geographically located in an unstable geopolitical region, a small state such as Georgia requires either a powerful ally for survival (such as the US) or a military alliance (such as NATO) (Thorhallsson and Bailes, 2017), “consequently, balancing Russian power, seen as primary for Georgia’s security, has constituted a major goal of Georgia’s foreign policy since 1994” (Kakachia and Minesashvili, 2015:175). Most importantly, it’s desire to join NATO is driven by the lack of hard power and material resources in the face of a growing Russian threat “with smaller populations, less absolute wealth and less territory, small states lack the self-sufficiency, resources and strategic depth needed to defend themselves, including the maintenance of adequate armed forces.” (Thorhallsson and Bailes, 2017:53.) Walt argues that although balancing is an option, bandwagoning from small states is more likely “the weaker the state, the more likely it is to bandwagon. Balancing may seem unwise because one’s allies may not be able to provide assistance quickly enough” (Walt, 1987: 29.). Proximity to the threatening power as well as the threatening power’s offensive capabilities increase the chances of bandwagoning. Yet, this has not been the case for Georgia, which can be explained by conflicting identities and values.

Georgia’s desire to join NATO is also driven by ideational factors such as the desire to ‘return to Europe’ and become a full-fledged liberal democracy. Whilst security imperatives remain the most important i.e., limiting policy options available to Georgia, the issues of identity and elite ideology in guiding Georgia’s foreign policy behaviour should not be disregarded as “transmission belts”. As argued by Kakachia and Minesashvili (2015), Georgia’s “other” due to its historical enmity and occupation, is Russia, inherently defining the West as part of “self” due to their shared values, history, and culture. Georgia’s foreign policy orientation has remained unchanged and stable, academics explaining this stability partially through its Western identity (Jones, 2003), “implying that the West is a model for Georgia’s development as a democracy as well as being the country’s major ally and protector” (Nodia, 2010 cited by Kakachia and Minesashvili, 2015:175). The discourse of Europeanness has been especially pronounced since the Rose Revolution, “an integral part of the European political, economic and cultural area, whose fundamental national values are rooted in European values and traditions” (National Security Concept of Georgia, 2005) also underlines that. From this perspective, Russia is not only seen as a security threat to Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, but also as an impediment to realize Georgia’s European identity and as possessing inherently incompatible values (Gvalia et al., 2013). Overall, therefore, Georgia’s membership to NATO is a way to guarantee its security and prosperity but also redefine itself as a European nation. These imperatives have guided Georgian political elites and decision-makers limiting policy choices available to them. 

2.3 The West’s Interest in Georgia 

Mearsheimer argues that this region does not represent a vital interest for NATO and the US, stating that Georgia is Russia’s backyard and should be left as such. I argue that this is not the case. Georgia’s geographical location in the South Caucasus at the crossroads between Europe and Asia is geopolitically and strategically important for the West. 

From a strategic perspective, the Black Sea Region is vital as Russia manages to project its influence globally. Khoshtaria discusses the need to contain Russia to avoid repercussions in the rest of the world, in line with rational deterrence theory, she argues that “the last 15 years have shown that the view that Russia’s actions in its backyard is contained to its backyard is wrong. What Russia does here, has repercussions in Syria, in other parts of the world. Containing Russia in Georgia is in the Western interest from a purely realist perspective” (Khoshtaria, 2021). She further underlines the need to secure European borders “problems in Ukraine or in Belarus directly translate into problems on European borders, therefore it’s a tool for Russia to promote instability in Europe. If Georgia and Ukraine were part of NATO, this issue of border security in Europe would be minimized.” (Khoshtaria, 2021). Coffey further argues that European stability is key for the US prosperity “the more we can expand this stability, the better for U.S. interests. Georgia is a key part of this” (Coffey, 2021). Hodges argues that competing in the Black Sea region is crucial to ensure that “Russia does not continue to use it as a launching pad for its malign behaviour not only in the Caucasus, but also in the Balkans, in Ukraine and in Syria. The Assad regime would have been gone years ago if not for Russian support, flowing from the Black Sea into Syria” (Hodges, 2021). 

From an economic perspective, key pipelines such as that of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline as well as Baku-Supsa pipeline pass by Georgia and oil and gas reserves are especially key for Europe’s energy security (Coffey, 2018). Hodges during our interview has argued that “there are three major east west corridors between Eurasia and Europe. One goes through Russia. One goes through Iran. One goes right through the Caucasus in the Black Sea. So, if we want to continue bringing in energy resources from Eurasia and from the Caspian region, the best route is one that would go right through Georgia, cross the Black Sea, bringing prosperity to Europe as well as the Caucasus” (Hodges, 2021). Furthermore, Georgia’s location provides an opportunity for US presence in the Black Sea region and as the Afghan case has shown, Georgia can serve as a key route for Western forces. “Georgia offered its territory, infrastructure, and logistic capabilities for the transit of NATO forces and cargo for Afghanistan” (Coffey, 2018). 

After the Rose Revolution, Georgia intensified its cooperation with NATO because of increasing tensions with Russia. In this context, Georgia has passed various military and political reforms and has actively modernized its defence sector, participating in NATO operations worldwide – it was the largest non-NATO contributor of troops per capita in Afghanistan (NATO, 2021). Thus, Georgia does not only seek security, but it can also contribute to the security of the Alliance. 

Chapter 3: NATO Bucharest Summit of 2008 and Georgia-Russia War 

3.1 Context 

To become a member of NATO, a state needs to satisfy various political, military, and economic criteria, according to the Study on Enlargement published by NATO in 1995. During the Shevardnadze period, despite rapprochement with the West, NATO membership was highly unrealistic due to internal turmoil, territorial conflict and overall, Georgia’s inability to meet any of the NATO requirements. In this context, Russia did not consider Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations seriously, the Kremlin officials stating that Moscow had no opposition to Georgia’s membership in any organizations, Russian Defence Minister Ivanov joking “let them join anything, even the League for Sexual Reform, if they wish” (RFE, 2002).However, as Georgia’s NATO membership became a serious prospect following the Rose Revolution in 2003 “especially once the US started to openly support Georgia’s NATO membership bid, under Saakashvili” (Gvalia, Lebanidze and Siroky, 2019:33) the Kremlin gradually expressed disapproval, both rhetorically as well as through its actions. Membership Action Plan, in 1999, was designed based on the experiences of Central European states, as a transitional period to prepare a country for NATO membership (NATO, 2020). When granting MAP to Georgia became a real possibility, prior to the Bucharest Summit in April, the Kremlin officials, including Foreign Minister Lavrov warned that Georgia’s membership “would be seen by Russia as a threat to its security” (RFE, 2008) and that “[Russia would do] all it can to prevent Ukraine’s and Georgia’s accession into NATO (DW, 2008). Putin even threatened to skip the meeting scheduled as part of NATO-Russia Council, if Ukraine and Georgia were given MAP (RFE, 2008). 

At the Bucharest Summit, among several issues, alliance members debated whether to grant MAP to Georgia and Ukraine. The US was the most prominent supporter “Rice and Gates could have gone either way. But Bush made that decision to push. Now, he made that decision with respect to the Baltic states and that worked. We thought we could convince the Germans and we were wrong. We ended up with this very strange compromise” said Fried (2021). Despite US, Canada and Eastern European states’ support, France and Germany opposed granting MAP on the grounds that this would provoke Russia. The German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Steinmeier underlined that “NATO has no reason to provoke Russia so strongly by inviting Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO […] This year there is no desperate need for more sour relations with Russia” (Rompres, 2008) especially after the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. He further underlined that Georgia’s unstable political situation was also a reason for Germany’s refusal to grant MAP. Whereas Merkel concluded “we think that the time for a MAP has not yet come.”(Civil.ge, 2008). From the French side, Fillon declared that “we oppose Georgian and Ukrainian accession because we believe that this is not the right answer in terms of balance of power in Europe and between Europe and Russia” (AFP, 2008 cited by Socor, 2008). Eventually, after hours of deliberations, allies reached what Robin Shepherd from the Chatham House argued was an “inevitable compromise”. NATO’s statement read: “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO […] These countries will become members of NATO.” (NATO, 2008) The US was unable to push forward with the agenda, partly due to reputational damage caused by the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. In 2021, George W. Bush in an interview, underlined that “[The biggest disagreement with Merkel was] probably whether or not Georgia should be given the membership application process to NATO” (Civil.ge, 2021). 

Putin concluded the meeting by stating that whilst membership for Georgia and Ukraine would be a direct threat to Russian security, “we evaluate the results of this meeting as positive […] the spirit of cooperation and search for compromise prevailed.” Russia was satisfied with the decision “Russian anger was mitigated by the alliance’s refusal to back Mr. Bush’s position” (Erlanger, 2008), “Russia’s pro-Kremlin mass media lauded the recent NATO decision in Bucharest, hailing it as a victory for departing Putin” (RFE, 2008). Moscow concluded that whilst Georgia’s NATO membership was realistic, it was not imminent due to strong divisions within the alliance, thus it could use this opportunity to test the West and punish Georgia (Asmus, 2010). 

3.2 Perceived Weakness and Failed Deterrence: A Munich Analogy? 

Shortly after the Bucharest Summit of 2008, in August war broke out and Russia invaded Georgia. The war followed a series of intensification of tensions. In April, Russia warned Georgia not to rely on NATO to resolve conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia ” (Rusi, 2008) and increased its troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by arguing that Georgia was planning an attack. In May, Russia deployed 300 ‘unarmed’ soldiers to Abkhazia, claiming they were required for railway repair works. Georgia stated that Russia was organizing a military intervention. By summer, violence escalated between Georgia and South Ossetian and Abkhazia troops. In July, there were reports of the flight of Russian jets over South Ossetia (Rusi, 2008). When Sakashvili declared a state of war, Georgia argued that it reacted to Russian military build-up and movement of Russian troops in the Roki tunnel, whilst Russia argued that it intervened to stop the genocide in the Tskhinvali region. EU commissioned report concluded that “the shelling of Tskhinvali by the Georgian armed forces during the night of 7 to 8 August 2008 marked the beginning of the large-scale armed conflict in Georgia, yet it was only the culminating point of a long period of increasing tensions, provocations and incidents” (Tagliavini, 2009:11). Whilst Russia argued that it acted under R2P, many believe that “Russia’s invasion was premeditated […] they were at least on the move toward the border […] the scope of the Russian attack leaves little doubt” (Cornell and Starr, 2009:4). Fried argues that “no matter the outcome of the Summit, Putin would have acted against Georgia in any case. He was building up to this. He was determined to bring down Saakashvili’s team” (Fried, 2021). Rice also underlines that during a call with Lavrov, one of the conditions for ending the war was regime change “Between us… Misha Saakashvili has to go” (Rice, 2018). Russia’s disproportionate response and invasion of Georgia, prompted the US to send the military including Pentagon aircraft and naval vessels to deliver humanitarian aid, guaranteeing US presence in Georgia (Schor, 2008). As argued by Khoshtaria in our interview “Russia’s aim was regime change but US presence in Tbilisi deterred them. This move was decisive to defend the capital” (Khoshtaria, 2021). 

Many have underlined that what precipitated the war in August 2008, was NATO’s statement that Georgia would become a member of NATO. The statement, however, did not specify when and how Georgia would join NATO, illustrating the disunity of the alliance rather than realistic promises of enlargement. Thus, contrary to the popular belief that this compromise caused war and threatened Russia, I argue that it was the opposite. Going back to theory, I intend to test my hypotheses. 25 

– First, I argued that the NATO Bucharest Summit statement exemplified an unclear and inconsistent policy regarding countries threatened by Russian aggression. 

Many respondents argued that NATO’s statement was a form of virtue signalling, reflecting an inconsistent and unclear strategy, not specifying when and how Georgia and Ukraine would join NATO “NATO was trying to save its face, Russia clearly understood that it has a veto on who gets NATO membership. Once Russia felt it had the power to act according to its ambitions without being substantially challenged by the West, it completely disregarded engagement with them not only in Georgia but in other parts of the world” (Khoshtaria, 2021). Similarly, Gordadze underlines that NATO’s strange statement was “kind of a medium decision for not losing face” that made apparent to Russia that “in fact, Moscow has a veto right on NATO enlargement” (Gordadze, 2021). Pavilionis argues that “in the Baltics, Russia used the same thinking, yet we were able to explain to the West that if the West is decisive and is clearly drawing the red line, Russia stops behaving aggressively” (Pavilionis, 2021). Indeed, the Kremlin has used similar aggressive rhetoric regarding the Baltic States. Before 2004, many in the West believed that Baltic States would not join NATO – “NATO members’ reluctance to admit the Baltic states will probably continue, leaving the latter outside of any functioning European security structure,” (Blank, 1997:1). The Russian Duma adopted a resolution that officially expressed its opposition to NATO enlargement in the Baltics. Moscow threatened, provoked, and intimidated Baltic states through sanctions and military exercises yet today, the Baltics states are an integral part of the European security system. Pavilionis argues that “In 1993, when it was announced that EU’s free trade agreements would lead to Association Agreement and then EU membership, that was the year Russia withdrew Soviet troops from Lithuania, they started to negotiate and respect us. We are an example of the West’s right policy – clarity was key. That is why we do not have Russian troops, we are secure. That was our argument in the Bucharest summit of 2008” (Pavilionis, 2021). Whilst Russia always opposed the process of enlargement, it maintained business as usual with the Alliance and the allies when Baltics states joined. (Lazarević, 2009: 42). Their experience shows that the narrative that enlargement causes bellicosity is historically inaccurate, it shows that clear strategy resulting in enlargement has brought security to these nations and has deterred Russian aggression. “Did we fight the Cold War to return Central and Eastern Europe to Moscow?” rhetorically asked Fried (2021) during our communication. 

– I further argued that Russia perceived this lack of credible commitment and absence of political will together with Western disunity as a sign of weakness. 

In line with Krauthammer (2013), I argued that political will is key – whilst the West has material capabilities, it lacks the political will to use them as necessary. This ultimately undermines Western credibility. Asmus criticized Western lack of response to the military build-up before the war, when Moscow was testing Georgians and allies, blaming Western failure to complement ritualistic statements with actual deterrence “had the West spoken with a clear and unified voice and told Moscow that a move against Georgia would have very real political and economic consequences, this war might also have been prevented. Russian forces stopped moving toward Tbilisi in August only when that threat of a major rethink of policy was finally made explicit by the United States” (Asmus, 2010:222). Hodges underlines that “the theory of deterrence is based on demonstrating real capability and the will to use that capability. And when you don’t use it, the adversary fills that vacuum” (Hodges, 2021). 

Within this context, “the only thing that provokes Russia is weakness and lack of action” (Hodges, 2021), citing Georgia but also Ukraine and Syria as examples of Western inaction “all of their aggression comes as a result of a lack of determined resistance” (Hodges, 2021). Gordadze discussed how European policymakers argued that through a policy of compromise, they successfully appeased Russia “French and German diplomats were congratulating themselves, saying “we avoided war” in May 2008” (Gordadze, 2021). Historically, the Munich analogy is relevant: Chamberlain also believed that he avoided war with Hitler “there are many differences with the Munich analogy, but the mechanism is quite comparable. In the West, they considered that they made a concession to Russia, to attenuate tensions that started with Kosovo’s independence. For Russia, this was a sign of Western weakness, a signal that the West is unwilling to integrate Georgia into NATO and thus, tacitly recognises Russia’s sphere of influence” (Gordadze, 2021). In line with this, Khoshtaria discussed how “the West has a mistaken view that compromise is a strength, believing that engagement will lead to success. This can work when the other player also views international politics this way. Russia does not, it understands power and force. Therefore, dealing with Russia, the way one would deal with the United Kingdom is damaging” (Khoshtaria, 2021). 

The disunity but most importantly, what this disunity represented: lack of readiness to defend Georgia in case of an attack, was perceived as an opportunity by the Kremlin to expand its control “they were able to show that NATO enlargement will never happen because they believed the West was weak, there was a division inside the western camp and there was no unity around this question. Putin saw the opportunity and seized it. That is why the war took place in August” (Gordadze, 2021). Khoshtaria underlined that the policy of compromise questioned the seriousness of NATO in the region: “Russia perceives the West as weak and unwilling to use force. This was illustrated in the Bucharest Summit. If not for Western complacency, Russia does not have the power to implement its ambitious policies” (Khoshtaria, 2021). Coffey further argues that “Putin respects two things: strength and consistency. If you show that you are powerful or that you are willing to use powerful military force as a deterrent, if your messaging is consistent and united among NATO members, he respects that. As soon as he senses that one of these two things are not there, whether it’s strength or consistency, then he will act. I believe that he is an opportunist and takes advantage of a situation – like Crimea, for example” (Coffey 2021). 

If demonstrating capability is key, it is important to underline that in 2020, only 10 NATO members and the US reached or exceeded the 2% target, France, and Norway for the first time, while others, notably Germany lagged behind (BBC, 2021). Coffey further argues that NATO encircling Russia is a myth “if you look at a map, there are more Russian troops outside of Russia’s borders bordering NATO countries than there are American troops in NATO countries bordering Russia. Russia is trying to show the image of it being surrounded by NATO” (Coffey 2021).

Chapter 4: Western Response to the Georgia-Russia War of 2008 and its Local and Global Implications 

Theoretically, due to the interdependence of commitments, reputation matters – countries that have appeared weak, irresolute, and backing down from their commitments are more likely to be challenged by the same opponent or by another revanchist power. 

– I argued that the response to the Georgia-Russia war undermined the West’s reputation for resolve and questioned its credibility, emboldening Russia. 

“Surprisingly, Russia’s 2008 conflict with Georgia did not lead to a fundamental reassessment of the Western approach” (Lyne, 2015:9) regarding Russia. As Kagan argued, “the lesson for Obama and his team was that the US needed better relations with Moscow to avoid future confrontations.” (Kagan, 2018). Obama, to attenuate tensions, “refused to sell Georgia even light, defensive weapons, such as A-4 rifles and anti-tank missiles and emphasized “democratization” as the main tool of defence” (Cohen, 2018). 29 

If we look at Russia’s actions following the 2008 war globally, despite a policy of compromise adopted by Western political elites, Russia became increasingly assertive and disruptive. The August war ended with the signing of a cease-fire agreement brokered by Nicolas Sarkozy, soon afterwards Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Western response to the Georgian crisis had local as well as global consequences. 

Georgians were disappointed by the lack of Western support, whilst Russia capitalized on the fear of war of the Georgian public (Falkowski, 2016). NATO policies as argued by Khoshtaria “provide fertile ground for the success of Russian disinformation, which will inherently lead to a decrease of influence of the West and therefore damage Western interests in Georgia” (Khoshtaria 2021). Gordadze (2021) further adds that NATO’s Summit Statements since 2008 reiterate that Georgia will become a member, yet these kinds of endless promises undermine Georgia’s pro-Western path. Whilst public support for Euro-Atlantic integration remains high and “Georgia has been an “A+” NATO student” (Wilson, 2014:1) since the war, the Georgian Dream government elected in 2012, has instrumentalized and normalized the Russian narrative, reinforcing pro-Kremlin groups and political parties that propagate anti-Western messages. In this context, democratic backsliding in Georgia and the oligarchic rule of Ivanishvili further damages NATO-Georgia cooperation and removes Georgia from the international agenda. As Pavilionis argued “for membership, democracy is essential. Georgia has a long way to go. Without democracy, Georgia cannot sell its case in the West. Currently, this is not clear” (Pavilionis, 2021). Today, 20% of Georgian territories are occupied by Russian forces and the Kremlin has continuously violated the cease-fire agreement, by pursuing a policy of borderization which involves constructing barbed wire fences around Georgian villages, slowly incorporating more and more territories, “NATO has done nothing to make Russia accountable” (Lazarević 2009:57). In deterrence literature, this phenomenon is known as salami slicing – “using a long series of low-level aggressions to change the facts on the ground without ever taking action that would justify a major response. Such strategies are designed to put the defender in a dilemma: It cannot respond to every small violation, but if it does not begin to punish minor transgressions, its strategic position will erode over time” (Mazarr, 2020:25). This same tactic has been used by Russia in Ukraine, the West only responding after Crimea’s occupation, in this sense, accepting it. 

Internationally, Russia has challenged the status quo through kinetic and non-kinetic means “history showed that Bucharest resulted in two occupations – Georgian and Ukrainian. After the Georgian occupation, the EU did not react, it expanded cooperation. I said that Ukraine was next” (Pavilionis, 2021). The Ukraine crisis in 2014 is hardly surprising and a clear result of “the West laissez-faire approach to Russia” (Nixey, 2015:7). In Syria, assisting the Assad regime also marked the desire of Russia to challenge US-led order and restore its status as a global player “Obama’s failure to implement red lines in Syria, shows the lack of political will the US has, despite its tremendous military power” (Khoshtaria, 2021). As Gordadze further argued “in Syria, Russia became part of the problem. Syria and Russia only stopped when there was a military response on the ground from Turkey and the US. Clear red line appears to Russia when there is a real demonstration of force. If not, they keep moving” (Gordadze, 2021). Emboldened, Russia directly launched an attack on Western democracies, by instrumentalizing existing grievances in societies and inciting polarization and erosion of liberal democratic values, by funding far-right political parties, by spreading disinformation and by interfering in elections: US and European nations such as France are case points (Lucas and Pomerantsev, 2016). In 2018, Russia used a chemical nerve agent on UK soil to poison a former spy, killing British citizens (Urban, 2018). Moscow launched a series of cyberattacks hacking governmental institutions and security systems – the OPCW in Denmark, the DNC and voter infrastructure in the US. In sum, despite attempts to appease Russia, the Kremlin’s revisionist ambitions have only grown since 2008. 

Conclusion 

If NATO enlargement into Russia’s sphere of influence caused Russian aggression, why has Moscow not invaded the Baltic States? By using classical theory of deterrence, the paper has tried to demonstrate that it is not enlargement that fuels Russian aggression, but a policy of non-enlargement, inconsistency and compromise as illustrated by the Russian invasion of Georgia. Mearsheimer and others NATO enlargement because it is part of the liberal agenda that incorporates democracy promotion and regime change, arguing that “one might think this policy is a classic deterrence strategy aimed at containing a potentially aggressive Russia, but it is not” (Mearsheimer, 2018:178), citing statements from Western officials where they reassure Russia about NATO’s liberal goals. NATO enlargement should be seen and talked about by the West as what it is and what it can be – a deterrent measure against Russia. Whilst a policy of engagement is sometimes the best option, in this case, compromise is ultimately perceived by opportunistic Russia as weakness and has not yielded desirable results, including stability. 

This paper has demonstrated that Russia is being offensive, not defensive and opposes NATO enlargement because it represents an obstacle in Kremlin’s attempt to challenge the post-Cold War order. The West’s lack of political will and ambivalence towards frontline states is misleading. Rhetorically supporting enlargement without actual plans to expand and without providing security guarantees to aspirant members faced with Russian occupation, is the root of the problem, endangering Georgia, and Ukraine. Creating a neutral Ukraine or Georgia as suggested by Mearsheimer, is neither desirable, nor realistic. First, because the West has strategic interests in this region – failing to deter Russia in Georgia, has global consequences, as the last 13 years has shown. Second, neutrality is not realistic because history shows that Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations should be seen as a reaction to Russian hostility. 

As argued by Gordadze (2021) “Russia’s objective is not to defeat the West militarily, because they know that they will lose. If they destroy the credibility of the West, it’s already a Russian victory”. Whilst the West now sees Russia as it is: a foe rather than a friend, the West lacks a consistent strategy. Imposing sanctions on Russia for election interference yet building Nord-Stream 2 pipeline in Germany thereby increasing dependency on Russia, sends inconsistent signals. Former President Trump’s sympathetic rhetoric towards Putin and criticism of its allies greatly damaged the unity of the West, whilst German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s comments regarding the Nord-Stream 2, separating commercial affairs from geopolitics cast doubt on the willingness of European nations to challenge Russian assertiveness. If the West does not combine its political will with its material power, it will greatly damage its credibility and reputation for resolve not only from a Russian perspective, but from China’s and Iran’s perspectives as well. Considering the interdependent nature of geopolitics, recent years have shown that European failure to deter Russia in a small country such as Georgia, resulted in being challenged at one’s own territory – Western Europe. In this context, cancelling the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia commissions at the Brussels NATO Summit of 2021 sends a wrong message to the Kremlin.